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Reflections on Conflict-of-Laws
Methodology
By PETER HAY*
I am glad to participate in the Hastings Law Journal's dia-
logue on current problems in conflict of laws. The questions posed
are both interesting and timely. I did find it difficult, however, sim-
ply to address them seriatim. Instead, I have treated them in the
context of a loosely structured and very summary essay; the foot-
notes contain more detailed analysis and documentation.
Constitutional Limitations on Jurisdiction and
Choice of Law
Statements in the case law and in the literature frequently
equate choice of law and jurisdiction. In his partial dissent in
Shaffer v. Heitner,1 Justice Brennan wrote:
I believe that practical considerations argue in favor of seeking to
bridge the distance between the choice-of-law and jurisdictional
inquiries. Even when a court would apply the law of a different
forum, as a general rule it will feel less knowledgeable and com-
fortable in interpretation, and less interested in fostering the poli-
cies of that foreign jurisdiction, than would the courts established
by the State that provides the applicable law.... [W]hen a suitor
seeks to lodge a suit in a State with a substantial interest in see-
ing its own law applied to the transaction in question, we could
wisely act to minimize conflicts, confusion, 'and uncertainty by
adopting a liberal view of jurisdiction, unless considerations of
fairness or efficiency strongly point in the opposite direction.2
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.A., 1958; J.D., 1958, University of
Michigan.
1. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
2. Id. at 225.26 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote
omitted). For further discussion regarding some of the thoughts expressed here, see Hay,
The Interrelation of Jurisdiction and Choice-of-Law in United States Conflicts Law, 28
INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 161 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Hay].
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Of course, it is easier to apply local law.' Familiarity with local law
may also make it appear to be superior to, and more just than,
foreign law, a circumstance that invariably leads courts adhering to
the "better law" approach to apply the law of the forum.4 Courts
thus may apply local law in true conflicts cases just because there
is local jurisdiction, or they may derive jurisdiction from the appli-
cability of, or the right to apply, local law.' An example of the for-
mer is Clay v. Sun Insurance Office8 in which one reason for the
Supreme Court's decision allowing Florida to apply its law to the
out-of-state insurance contract was that the defendant company,
licensed to do business in Florida, "must have ... known that it
3. "The judge applying foreign law is a dilettante, a beginner; he is timid. The judge
applying the lex fori is a learned expert; he is a sovereign, superior judge." Zweigert, Some
Reflections on the Sociological Dimensions of Private International Law or What Is Jus-
tice in Conflict of Laws?, 44 U. COLO. L. Rv. 283, 293 (1973). See also Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 101 S.Ct. 633, 647 & n.14 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
4. See, e.g., Tiernan v. Westext Transp., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1256 (D.R.I. 1969); Myers
v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 302 Minn. 359, 225 N.W.2d 238 (1974); Schwartz v. Con-
solidated Freightways Corp., 300 Minn. 487, 221 N.W.2d 665 (1974); Milkovich v. Saari, 295
Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973); Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254
(1968); Mitchell v. Crafts, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968); Maguire v. Exeter & Hampton Elec.
Co., 114 N.H. 589, 325 A.2d 778 (1974); Gagne v. Berry, 112 N.H. 125, 290 A.2d 624 (1972);
Taylor v. Bullock, 111 N.H. 214, 279 A.2d 585 (1971); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d
205 (1966); Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.L 290, 243 A.2d 917, cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 957
(1968); Hunker v. Royal Indem. Co., 57 Wis. 2d 588, 204 N.W.2d 897 (1973); Conklin v.
Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968); Zellinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 38
Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W.2d 466 (1968); Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664
(1967). But see Lichter v. Fritsch, 77 Wis. 2d 178, 252 N.W.2d 360 (1977). It is interesting to'
note that virtually all cases adopting the better-law approach have been tort or tort-related
(wrongful death) actions. Even in Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1978),
aff'd on rehearing, 289 N.W.2d 50 (Minn. 1979), af'd, 101 S. Ct. 633 (1981), which involved
the question of "stacking" insurance coverage, the lower court carefully noted that this was
not an "ordinary contract case" but arose in the context of indemnity for a tortious injury.
Id. at 47. For further discussion of Hague, see notes 71-88 & accompanying text infra. See
also Hime v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 284 N.W.2d 829 (Minn. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1032 (1980). The only exceptions to the general trend towards applying the lex fori
under the better-law approach are Hunker v. Royal Indem. Co., 57 Wis. 2d 588, 204 N.W.2d
897 (1973) and Lichter v. Fritsch, 77 Wis. 2d 178, 252 N.W.2d 360 (1977). Hunker applied
foreign law as more consistent with the policy of worker's compensation, while in Lichter,
only the application of foreign law permitted recovery. Higher compensation levels thus pro-
vided the "governmental interest" for the application of the lex fori in all cases except
Lichter and Maguire and therefore also made it the "better law." The only exception to this
pattern is Maguire v. Exeter & Hampton Elec. Co., 114 N.H. 589, 325 A.2d 778 (1974), in
which there was an interest in limiting the local defendant's liability.
5. For a discussion of some constitutional limitations on choice of law, see notes 15-58
& accompanying'text infra. The question still remains whether the right (or power) to apply
local law makes the choice of that law appropriate.
6. 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
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might be sued there."'7 The result may well have been correct, be-
cause "Florida [for regulatory reasons] had sufficient interest in
the case to justify application of its law."8 Florida's interest, how-
ever, is a necessary conceptual link. Without this element, it does
not follow that amenability to suit also should result in the appli-
cation of local law. Indeed, if the link-the state's interest-is
lacking, the application of local law may be unconstitutional, espe-
cially when it imposes or extends liability as in Clay. For this rea-
son, the jurisdictional issue quite apart,9 Rosenthal v. Warren'0
represents not only a poor choice of law, but it may represent an
unconstitutional application of New York law."' Plaintiff's domi-
cile alone is not enough to justify applying forum law.'2 As in the
case of jurisdiction, 3 there must be a nexus of defendant, litiga-
tion, and forum, 14 at least as long as the continued validity of tran-
sient jurisdiction remains unclear.
7. Id. at 182 (quoting Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 221 (1960) (Black, J.,
dissenting)).
8. Reese, Limitations on the Extraterritorial Application of Law, 4 DALHOuSm L.J.
589, 602 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Reese].
9. Jurisdiction in Rosenthal was based on the attachment of an insurance policy, as in
Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). This basis of juris-
diction-when the defendant's only contact with the forum state is the fact that its insurer
does business in that state-was later held to be unconstitutional. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444
U.S. 320 (1980).
10. 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973). In Warren, a New York
resident went to Boston to seek the help of a world-renowned surgeon and died after the
operation. In a wrongful death action brought in New York, the court applied New York law
with respect to damages rather than Massachusetts law, which imposes a $50,000 limit on
wrongful death recoveries. The majority's stated reasons for the decision-the interstate
nature of the transaction and that the hospital and the surgeon treated patients from all
over the world-would seem to apply equally if the two states had different standards of
care. In those circumstances, the application of New York law should clearly be unconstitu-
tional. See also Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
11. See Reese, supra note 8, at 605. See also note 51 infra.
12. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). The conclusion applies with par-
ticular. force to a plaintiff's postaccident change of domicile. Cf. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S.
320 (1980) (argument not even raised). But cf. Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43
(Minn. 1978), aff'd on rehearing, 289 N.W.2d 50 (Minn. 1979), afl'd, 101 S. Ct. 633 (1981)
(concerning choice of law). For a discussion of Hague, see notes 71-88 & accompanying text
infra. Even where the plaintiff sues in the defendant's domicile, the existence of jurisdiction
does not make it permissible, absent other connecting factors, to apply the lex fori. Thus, in
my view, Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964), unconstitutionally applied
Oregon law to permit avoidance of an Oregon spendthrift's contract that had been made in
California with a Californian, and that was to be performed in California. Accord, Reese
supra note 8, at 598-99.
13. See notes 15-52 & accompanying text infra.
14. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
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Judicial jurisdiction is the flip side of the coin. Shaffer v. Heit-
ner,15 Kulko v. Superior Court,"6 and World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson 7 all demonstrate that the applicability of local
law"' does not justify, without more, jurisdiction over out-of-state
defendants. Relying on Hanson v. Denckla,19 Justice Marshall
wrote in Shaffer: "[W]e have rejected the argument that if a
State's law can properly be applied to a dispute, its courts necessa-
rily have jurisdiction over the parties to that dispute."20 This lan-
guage rejects Professor Silberman's suggestion that, "if a court has
the power to apply its own law, it should have the power to exer-
cise jurisdiction over the action. ' 21 Power to apply local law existed
in all three cases, 2 but jurisdiction did not automatically follow;
once again, one element of the nexus trilogy-defendant, litigation,
and forum-was lacking.
Similarly, I find no support in the case law for the second as-
pect of a suggestion by Professor Sedler. He argues that "when the
connection between a party's activities and a State are such that
the state constitutionally can exercise jurisdiction over that party
under its long-arm act, the State constitutionally can apply its own
substantive law to determine the liability of that party. '2 So far,
so good:24 the facts giving rise to long-arm jurisdiction typically do
relate both the defendant and the cause of action to the forum.
15. Id.
16. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
17. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
18. In Shaffer, the majority and the dissent agreed that Delaware law might be appli-
cable. 433 U.S. at 216 (majority); id. at 225 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 309 (1971). In Kulko,
Justice Marshall conceded that "California may be the 'center of gravity' for choice of law
purposes. . . ." 436 U.S. at 98. In World-Wide Volkswagen, Oklahoma law arguably could
have been applied to the issue of products liability under the modern trend that looks to the
law most favorable to the plaintiff. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 274-75 (3d ed.
1977); Kihne, Choice of Law in Products Liability, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1972).
19. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). "[The state] does not acquire... jurisdiction by being the
'center of gravity' of the controversy, or the most convenient location for litigation. The
issue is personal jurisdiction, not choice of law." Id. at 254.
20. 433 U.S. at 215.
21. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U.L. REv. 33, 88 (1978)
(emphasis in original).
22. See note 18 supra.
23. Sedler, Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: The Consequences of Shaffer v.
Heitner, 63 IOWA L. REv. 1031, 1033 (1978).
24. Nevertheless, and contrary to Professor Sedler's suggestion, it is still open to ques-
tion whether a state not only "can" but should apply local law, for instance to further the
forum's governmental interests or because it is the "better law." Id. at 1034.
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The proffered corollary, however, that "when a state may not con-
stitutionally exercise long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident
party its substantive law should not be constitutionally applicable
to determine the liability of the nonresident party either,'" does
not necessarily follow. Often, of course, the statement will be true,
but again, at times it will not. Apart from questions about its de-
sirability, is the First Restatement's place-of-injury rule"8 alwayS2 7
unconstitutional, in the sense that a New York court could not
have applied Oklahoma's products liability law in a case like
World-Wide Volkswagen? If Ms. Kulko had sought support modi-
fication in New York, could not New York have considered and
applied California standards? Or, if Mr. Kulko had moved to a
third jurisdiction and if Ms. Kulko had sued there, would that
court have been restricted to forum or New York law, or could it
also have resorted to California law and practice? s
Is not "foreseeability" as desirable a test in choice of law as it
is for jurisdiction? 2 Professor Martin argues forcefully and con-
vincingly that it "turns things on their head" to require
minimum contacts with the forum state merely to hale... [the
defendant] into the forum's court while allowing more tenuous
contacts to upset the very outcome of the case. Simple fairness
seems to demand that when the forum's intrusion is much more
destructive of his interests, as when it applies its own law, the
forum be held to at least as high a standard as is exacted in the
jurisdiction cases.8 0
Professor Martin acknowledges that the argument might be re-
versed if the matter were viewed from the perspective of the forum
having little interest in trying minimally connected cases, but a
great interest, when it has jurisdiction, advancing forum policies by
25. Id. at 1039 (emphasis in original).
26. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934).
27.. There may be instances in which application of that rule should be impermissible.
For instance, I would have no difficulty accepting the conclusion that application of
Cambodian law in the circumstances of Challoner v. Day & Zimmerman, 512 F.2d 77 (5th
Cir.), rev'd, 423 U.S. 3' (1975), should have been unconstitutional. The Fifth Circuit reached
the same result-inapplicability of Cambodian law-through interest analysis, but was re-
versed by the Supreme Court. See note 107 infra.
28. See, e.g., Elkind v. Byck, 68 Cal. 2d 453, 439 P.2d 316, 67 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1968);
Petersen v. Petersen, 24 Cal. App. 3d 201, 100 Cal. Rptr. 822 (1972). See also note 18 supra.
29. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). For a
discussion of the foreseeability test, see text accompanying notes 37-41 infra.
30. Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. Rav. 872, 879-80
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Martin].
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applying forum law. 1 He would strike the balance in favor of the
defendant, however, both because of the constitutional demands
for fairness3 2 for the defendant and because of the legitimate con-
cerns of the other jurisdiction, which, a fortiori, is more substan-
tially connected to the defendant and the cause of action than is
the minimally connected forum. I agree.
While the new jurisdictional decisions continue to use the
"minimum contacts" language, originally established by Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington," they go beyond previous doctrine,
for instance, through the introduction of the "foreseeability" test
of World-Wide Volkswagen.3 4 1 do not see the "foreseeability" cri-
terion as the substitution of a new, vague, and general test for the
earlier "minimum contacts. . . [so that maintenance of the action
would not] offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' ",s5 Instead, while International Shoe and subsequent
cases 8 had expanded state court jurisdiction to afford a local fo-
rum to the plaintiff, subject only to outer-limits protection for the
defendant, the new cases seek to restore greater balance to the
pendulum that had swung too far. They are more defendant-ori-
ented. The defendant is not to be haled into court when he or she
has not set foot in the jurisdiction even though that state has some
interest in regulating him or her,3 7 or when it was not "foresee-
able" that the defendant would be haled into court even though it
may have been foreseeable, or not unforeseeable, that the defen-
dant's product might cause injury in the forum.38 The defendant
must have direct contacts,39 or have derived a direct benefit"0 from
31. Id. at 880.
32. Id. See also Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in
Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 94 (1976); Martin, A Reply to Professor Kirgis, 62 COR-
NELL L. REV. 15 (1976); Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL
L. REV. 185 (1976).
33. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
34. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
35. 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
36. E.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957).
37. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 213 (1977).
38. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-97 (1980). See
also The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARv. L. REV. 77, 107-16 (1980).
39. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
40. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298-99 (1980). See
also O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963).
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the forum state, or the nature of the defendant's business must be
such-for example, nationwide 41-that the exercise of jurisdiction
may be based on the benefits theory or may be considered the
price exacted for doing nationwide business-both of which also
make for foreseeability.
The jurisdictional decisions thus limit the available fora. In-
deed, jurisdictional decisions, such as Hanson v. Denckla, will
often shift the focus from choice of law to judicial jurisdiction and,
by addressing the latter, avoid considering the former. Neverthe-
less, multiple fora will still often be available. They should be; con-
cerns for fairness to the defendant must not go entirely at the ex-
pense of the plaintiff who, within the constraints discussed, should
be able to resort to a convenient forum. 42 If this freedom is pre-
41. See Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980). In Oswalt, a foreign
manufacturer utilized a national distributor subject to jurisdiction in the state in which the
injury occurred. The court held that the nature of the business activity made the suit "fore-
seeable." Id. at 199-200. See also Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22
Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
42. "This case does not raise, and we therefore do not consider, the question whether
the presence of a defendant's property in a State is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction when
no other forum is available to the plaintiff." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 n.37
(1977). I have argued elsewhere that this suggestion may preserve quasi-in-rem jurisdiction
over some foreign-country defendants. Hay, supra note 2, at 175-76. Another reason the
Shaffer/World-Wide Volkswagen line of cases should not be read unduly narrowly is that
"procedural requirements-for instance, the joinder of multiple parties-may warrant a
wider jurisdictional reach.
At the same time, recent state and federal decisions show increasing sensitivity to the
standards set forth in World-Wide Volkswagen and have dismissed actions which formerly
might have been considered to be within a state's jurisdictional reach. See Grove Valve &
Regulator Co., Inc. v. Iranian Oil Serv. Ltd., 87 F.R.D. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (neither mainte-
nance of a checking account in New York nor agency relationship with another foreign cor-
poration amounted to "doing business" in New York); Stephens v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv.
Co., 87 Ill. App. 3d 961, 970, 409 N.E.2d 423, 429-30 (1980) ("personal injuries sustained in a
construction accident in Indiana [have] only the remotest and most attenuated of connec-
tions with the defendant's limited activities in Illinois"); Green v. Advance Ross Elec. Corp.,
87 Ill. App. 3d 279, 408 N.E.2d 1007 (1980) (third party defendant's Illinois contacts insuffi-
cient to satisfy either the Illinois long-arm statute or the requirements of due process);
Cook, Inc. v. Lexington United Corp., 86 Ill. App. 3d 909, 913, 407 N.E.2d 944, 947 (1980)
("insufficient relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation to show that
Lexington could have reasonably anticipated being haled into court"). See also Capital
Dredge & Dock Corp. v. Midwest Dredging Co., 573 F.2d 377 (6th Cir. 1978) (insufficient
contacts); Hurletron Whittier, Inc. v. Bards, 82 I1. App. 3d 443, 402 N.E.2d 840 (1980)
(defendant's business contacts too tenuous). But see Thilman & Co. v. Esposito, 87 IlM. App.
3d 289, 408 N.E.2d 1014 (1980) (participation in trial on merits after initial special appear-
ance sufficed for exercise of personal jurisdiction); AAAA Creative, Inc. v. Sovereign Holi-
days, Ltd., 76 Ill. App. 3d 514, 395 N.E.2d 66 (1979) (defendant voluntarily invoked the
protection of Illinois law; thus requisite minimum contacts existed between defendant and
[Vol. 32
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served in some measure, however, the question about limitations
on choice of law again looms large. Only a parallel develop-
ment-"minimum contacts" (at least) and "foreseeability"-in
choice of law will protect the defendant's substantive rights when a
minimally connected forum is allowed to exercise jurisdiction.
"Minimum contacts" analysis for jurisdiction and for choice of
law should not be the same. The former serve to relate the defen-
dant to the forum state; the latter should do the same for the cause
of action. Forum law should not be applied to an unrelated cause
of action as against a defendant with minimal jurisdictional con-
nections. This view is a modification of the late Professor
Ehrenzweig's goal for the application of the "proper law in the
proper forum." s
forum). The Illinois cases cited are especially instructive because they may signal a retreat
from, or reinterpretation of, the expansive approach of such earlier cases as Gray v. Ameri-
can Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), Nelson v.
Miller, 11 111. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957), and Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 51 Ill.
App. 3d 296, 367 NXE.2d 118 (1977). These decisions also draw into question Professor Allo's
conclusion, advanced prior to World-Wide Volkswagen, that the tests of Shaffer and Kulko
will inure more to the benefit of individual rather than of corporate defendants. Allo, Book
Review, 30 J. LEGAL EDuc. 612, 621-23 (1980) (reviewing J. MARTIN, CONFLICT OF LAWS:
CAsEs AND MATERIALS (1978)).
43. Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper Forum: A "Restatement" of the "Lex Fori
Approach," 18 OKLA. L. REv. 340 (1965). Professor Ehrenzweig pleaded for a limitation of
the available fora and the concomitant application of the lex fori in most cases. At the time,
his view was unrealistic because the assertion of jurisdiction was then expanding rather than
contracting. A severe limitation of jurisdiction that would make the application of the lex
fori reasonable in all cases-for instance, jurisdiction limited to the defendant's domicile or
principal place of business, advocated by Justice O'Connell in his dissent in State ex rel.
White Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Or. 121, 128-40, 448 P.2d 571, 574-80
(1968)-is not to be expected, nor would this be desirable. See note 42 & accompanying text
supra. As a consequence, the "proper law in the proper forum" requires limitations on the
choice of law.
One useful test has recently been suggested with respect to judicial jurisdiction: "Sub-
stantive relevance provides a natural test. A contact is related to the controversy if it is the
geographical qualification of a fact relevant to the merits. A forum occurrence which would
ordinarily be alleged as part of a comparable domestic complaint is a related contact. In
contrast, an occurrence in the forum State of no relevance to a totally domestic cause of
action is an unrelated contact, a purely jurisdictional allegation with no substantive pur-
pose. If a fact is irrelevant in a purely domestic dispute, it does not suddenly become related
to the controversy simply because there are multi-state elements." Brilmayer, How Contacts
Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. CT. REv. 77, 82-83.
See also id. at 101-102. Thus, "forum/litigation contacts do not automatically suffice to af-
ford jurisdiction." Id. at 101. These ideas obviously also lend themselves to application with
respect to choice of law. Professor Brilmayer suggests as much when she urges that the focus
be on a state's "legitimate interests" as a precondition to the right to apply the lex fori:
"Whether a contact justifies application of a rule depends . . .upon whether there is a
July 1981]
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"Foreseeability" in choice of law also may have to work differ-
ently from the way it does in jurisdiction. That injury might occur
in Oklahoma was foreseeable or, at least, not unforeseeable in
World-Wide Volkswagen." On the other hand, in the Court's view,
the New York local dealer could not foresee or expect that it would
be haled into court in Oklahoma, but, given the nation-wide nature
of its business, Volkswagen of America, Inc. could foresee such an
event.45 The importer and national distributor therefore could be
sued where the injury occurred, either on a benefits or a price-of-
doing business theory, while the local dealer could not. To both
sets of defendants, however, forum law or the law of the place of
injury could constitutionally be applied.46 Similarly, in Kulko,47
California law could have been applied to the support modifica-
tion, as the Court acknowledged, 8 but jurisdiction did not lie be-
cause of a lack of defendant contacts with California. Finally, after
the demise of the Seider v. Roth"9 jurisdictional mechanism, both
the exercise of jurisdiction and the application of local law by the
New York court in Rosenthal v. Warren5 0 may be considered con-
stitutionally improper. The doctor had not solicited business in
New York; whatever other connections he might have had with
that state were unrelated to the cause of action; and the place of
injury was not fortuitous (indeed the place of injury could only be
Massachusetts). Application of the plaintiff's domiciliary law
therefore was surely not foreseeable.5 1 In Rosenthal, then, the fac-
regulatory nexus between the rule and the event comprising the contact.. .. The regulatory
explanation linking the contact to the issue must be a bona fide internal law policy. Policies
that serve no domestic regulatory function but only conflict-of-laws purposes are not enti-
tled to constitutional recognition .... They beg the constitutional question and are the
product of decision making processes that do not adequately reflect the interests of other
states and the federal system." Brilmayer, "Legitimate Interests" in Multistate Problems:
As Between State and Federal Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. -, - (June 1981).
44. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
45. The same was true of the national distributor in Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d
191 (5th Cir. 1980). Accord, Poyner v. Erma Werke GMBH, 618 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1980);
Le Manufacture Francaise des Pneumatiques Michelin v. District Court, 620 P.2d 1040
(Colo. 1980).
46. See note 18 supra.
47. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
48. See notes 18, 28 supra.
49. See note 9 supra.
50. See note 10 supra.
51. See Chancellor v. Lawrence, 501 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. IM. 1980). Chancellor involved
a medical malpractice suit, brought as a civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976);
federal subject matter jurisdiction was premised on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1343 (1976). As
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tors that make for lack of foreseeability for both jurisdiction and
choice of law converge.
These considerations go to Professor Martin's emphasis on
constitutionally required fairness to the defendant. They apply, in
choice-of-law determinations, to federal concerns as well.
[T]he balance that is being struck is not simply between the fo-
rum state and the defendant resisting the application of the fo-
rum's law. In any case in which the contacts with the forum state
are less than "minimum contacts," the contacts with some other
state must be more substantial. Thus the balance is between the
plaintiff and the forum state-whose contacts are slight-on one
side and the defendant and the state whose law he invokes
-whose contacts are substantial-on the other. . . . The alterna-
tive to a system of federal law requiring a particular choice of law
[in view of the states' inability thus far to evolve common ap-
proaches] is to provide for limitations on the states' choice of
law.5 2
This suggestion goes a long way towards achieving a federal
balance, which the Supreme Court's decisions under the full faith
and credit clause5" have not yet provided.5' I differ with Professor
to some defendants, the court found personal jurisdiction under the Illinois long-arm statute
but held that proper venue was in Texas rather than in Illinois: "The operation, the alleg-
edly deficient surgical and post-operative care, and the alleged lack of disclosure to the
plaintiff all occurred in Texas. Indeed, although plaintiff was a ward of Illinois, it appears
that all events having 'operative significance' in the case are centered in Texas." 501 F.
Supp. at 1006. The court thus sustained the venue objections but stated that it was pre-
pared to order a transfer to Texas under 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (1976). 501 F. Supp. at 1006.
52. Martin, supra note 30, at 881. For a discussion of state approaches, see notes 89-
136 & accompanying text infra.
53. U.S. CONsT. art. 4, § 2.
54. In the early, pre-Erie decision in Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145
(1932), a full-faith-and-credit case, the Court announced a choice-of-law rule, based on a
finding that New Hampshire lacked the requisite interests to apply its own law. The Court
stated that a sister state's law must be applied unless doing so would be "obnoxious" to the
forum state's law and policy. In subsequent cases, the "obnoxiousness" test was used to
permit the application of local law. See Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S.
532 (1935). The distinction between due process and full faith and credit had seemed to
disappear in Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 40 (1955); yet the "obnoxiousness" test, which, if
satisfied, dispenses with the full-faith-and-credit requirement, reappeared in Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979). The balancing that inheres in the "obnoxiousness" test was finally
carried over to the recognition of worker's compensation awards, and possibly to judgments,
by the plurality in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980), a deplorable
opinion that can only add to the existing confusion and uncertainty. See notes 158-59 &
accompanying text infra. See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 101 S. Ct. 633 (1981) (dis-
cussed at notes 71-88 & accompanying text infra).
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Martin's analysis only as follows. In the passage quoted, Professor
Martin contrasts the forum state that has "less than 'minimum
contacts'" with another state whose contacts must necessarily be
more substantial. The same is true, it seems to me, when the forum
state does have minimum contacts: the contacts of another state
may still be more substantial. If the focus is only on due process to
the defendant, minimum contacts may indeed suffice in that they
may meet the foreseeability test in choice of law discussed above. 5
However, "[t]he minimum contacts approach to legislative jurisdic-
tion also has obvious benefits for interstate relations." 56 Federalism
should require that states not "push [the] application of their laws
to the limits"'5 7 at the expense of sister states-a thought that
evokes the old, but lost, distinction between due process and full
faith and credit in the choice-of-law process.5 s Federal concerns
may require more than the most minimal (foreseeable) contacts of
the defendant and the cause of action to the forum state. This is
another reason why minimum contacts for jurisdiction and choice
of law are not, and should not be, the same, even though they may
overlap factually in a particular case.
My second disagreement with Professor Martin's analysis con-
cerns his exclusion of the substance-procedure characterization
from the minimum-contacts requirement for the application of fo-
rum law.59 Surely, however, a state should not be able to bootstrap
itself into the position to apply any part of its law by simply char-
acterizing an issue as "procedural," no matter how universally the
particular characterization has been accepted. To put it differently.
a universally accepted characterization-for instance, that general
statutes of limitation are "procedural"-may appear to be "reason-
able" at first blush. I suggest that the inquiry must go beyond this.
Both Home Insurance Co. v. Dicke° and John Hancock Mutual
55. See notes 45-51 & accompanying text supra.
56. Martin, supra note 30, at 881 (footnote omitted).
57. Id. See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980)
(express reference to the "principles of interstate federalism").
58. See note 54 supra.
59. "A forum state may always apply its own 'procedural' law to a case no matter how
minimal its contacts with the defendant." Martin, supra note 30, at 883. "A state should be
able to label an issue 'procedural' and apply its own law as long as that label appears rea-
sonable." Id. at 885.
60. 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (Texas could not constitutionally apply its law to invalidate a
contractual time limitation in an insurance contract, made in Mexico and covering the in-
sured boat in Mexican waters only, when the insured was domiciled in Texas, but at all
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Life Insurance Co. v. Yates"1 pointed the way, and Clay v. Sun
Insurance Office is distinguishable.6 2 Even Wells v. Simonds Abra-
sive Co. 6 3 and the early decision in McElmoyle v. Cohen64 are dis-
tinguishable because the dismissal on the basis of the forum's
shorter statute of limitations was not on the merits.6 5 But what if a
forum with jurisdiction but no contacts with the transaction ap-
plies its longer "procedural" statute of limitations to a cause of
action barred by the only law to which it has a connection? Justice
Brandeis's dictum in Home Insurance"' saw no difference between
this and cases like Wells and McElmoyle. Why should the "proce-
dural" characterization in the area of limitations be treated differ-
ently from the attempted, but impermissible, procedural character-
ization in Yates? To put the distinction solely on the basis that the
latter affected the outcome while the former merely relates to the
remedy, and not the substance, is too facile. The longer limitation
of the unconnected forum prolongs the defendant's exposure, does
not advance any interests of the forum, and may well frustrate pol-
icies of the connected state or states.67 Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers
relevant times was a resident of Mexico.)
61. 299 U.S. 178 (1936) (reversal of Georgia court's characterization of materiality of
misrepresentation as a matter of "procedure," to be governed by local law).
62. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964). In Clay, the longer Florida stat-
ute of limitation extended liability but did not create it-admittedly, a highly debatable
distinction. See note 67 & accompanying text infra. In addition, the contract of insurance by
its own terms provided world-wide coverage and contained no choice-of-law clause in favor
of Illinois where it was issued and where the time limitation may have been valid, the loss
had occurred in the forum, and the company "knew" that the insured property had been
removed to Florida. 377 U.S. at 181-82.
63. 345 U.S. 514 (1953) (summary judgment for defendant under Pennsylvania's one-
year limitation of action based on Alabama's Wrongful Death Act which contained a two-
year limitation).
64. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312 (1839) (Georgia permitted to apply its own shorter statute of
limitations to bar enforcement of a South Carolina judgment).
65. See generally R. J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 515 (2d
ed. 1980).
66. "[I]n the absence of a contractual provision, the local statute of limitation may be
applied to a right created in another jurisdiction even where the remedy in the latter is
barred." 281 U.S. at 409.
67. "A 'hog-wild' characterization which results in application of the law of a state
that has no substantial relation to the facts violates the federal due process clause." R. A.
LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 177 n.9 (3d ed. 1977) (citing Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281
U.S. 347 (1930)). "Home Insurance.. .and. . .Yates warn us that a forum's procedural
characterization can go too far. It goes too far not because of any technical rule of character-
ization, but for the same 'fair play and substantial justice' reasons that make it unconstitu-
tional when any court deprives any person of his life, liberty, or property by applying a law
which has so little substantial connection with the issues in his case as to make the apppli-
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Corp."8 is a good example. As Professor Martin noted elsewhere,"
the decision quite arguably reached an unconstitutional result.
Thus, whether or not an issue has traditionally been characterized
as procedural, the automatic application of local law does not and
should not follow. The minimum contacts test should also encom-
pass characterization, for the sake of both due process to the de-
fendant and responsibility to the "federal concerns" to which I re-
ferred earlier and will do so again below.7 0
The United States Supreme Court's most recent conflict-of-
laws decision, in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,71 requires sepa-
rate comment. In brief, the Court upheld Minnesota's application
of forum law, which permitted "stacking" of uninsured motorist
insurance benefits, to a claim arising from the accidental death of a
Wisconsin resident in Wisconsin. 2 The uninsured operator of the
other vehicle was also a Wisconsin resident. Writing for the plural-
ity, Justice Brennan-as he had in his partial dissent in Shaf-
ferf78 -identified three "contacts" with the case, which, in the ag-
gregate, satisfy the newly announced test "that for a State's
substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible
manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of
its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair. '7 4
First, the fact that the decedent had worked in Minnesota on
a commuting basis for fifteen years and was thus a member of the
Minnesota work force gave Minnesota an "interest." "While em-
ployment status may implicate a state interest less substantial
than does resident status, that interest is nevertheless important.
cation an unreasonable one." R. A. LEFLAR, AMERiCAN CONPLIcTs LAW 120 (3d ed. 1977).
68. 448 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Kan. 1978), rev'd, 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979). Upon fed-
eral transfer from Mississippi, the Kansas trial court in Schreiber had refused to apply the
longer Mississippi statute of limitation to a cause of action brought by a Kansas plaintiff for
injuries suffered in Kansas, reasoning that the Mississippi transferor court itself could not
have entertained the action for lack of jurisdiction, or, alternatively, that Mississippi would
not apply its statute to an unrelated claim. The Tenth Circuit reversed. For a recently sug-
gested test which would have led to a different result, see note 43 supra.
69. Martin, Statutes of Limitations and Rationality in the Conflict of Laws, 19
WASHBURN L.J. 405 (1980). For further comment, see note 107 infra.
70. See text accompanying notes 102, 114, 148-52, 161-63 infra.
71. 101 S. Ct. 633 (1981).
72. Id. at 636, 640.
73. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 223 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). For a criticism of this approach, see Hay, supra note 1, at 173-74.
74. 101 S. Ct. at 640.
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The State of employment has police power responsibilities towards
the non-resident employee.... [S]uch employees use state services
and amenities and may call upon state facilities in appropriate cir-
cumstances. ' '75 Justice Brennan summarizes: "Employment status
is not a sufficiently less important status than residence. . . when
combined with [the decedent's] daily commute . . . and the other
Minnesota contacts. . . to prohibit the choice-of-law result .... ,,7
I agree that one type of status is not necessarily less important
than another, but its importance depends on the purpose for which
one asks the question. That employment status in Minnesota
should give that state "police power responsibilities" and an inter-
est in what happens between two Wisconsin residents in Wisconsin
and in the insurance obligations entered into in Wisconsin is a
jump in logic that I fail to follow. It would be stretching it to apply
this reasoning even if the accident had occurred while the decedent
was commuting to or from work in Minnesota; however, even that
had not been the case.
The second contact-Allstate's doing business in Minne-
sota-is said to be important for the same reason that it was in
Clay." I quoted Clay's language earlier"8 and attempted to show
why that reasoning does not follow. A further important distinc-
tion is that, in Clay, the loss was incurred in Florida. This differ-
ence, however, is not noted by the Court.
The third contact-the plaintiff's move to Minnesota and ap-
pointment there as the estate's personal representative following
the accident-is equally irrelevant. Surely both the subjective de-
termination that "[tihere is no suggestion that [the plaintiff]
moved to Minnesota in anticipation of ... litigation or for the
purpose of finding a legal climate especially hospitable to her
claim ''Th and the conclusion that Minnesota has an interest in the
administration of a local estate and, with it, in a recovery by the
personal representative, 0 are bootstrap arguments. A postaccident
change of domicile ordinarily should not be enough"1 because of
75. Id. at 640-41.
76. Id. at 642.
77. Id. at 642-43.
78. See text accompanying notes 6-7 supra.
79. 101 S. Ct. at 643.
80. Id. at 643-44.
81. "[Tjhe post-accident residence of the plaintiff-beneficiary is constitutionally irrele-
vant to the choice-of-law question." Id. at 653 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing John Hancock
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the potential for forum shopping; administration of a Minnesota
estate occurred only because the plaintiff, after her postaccident
change of domicile, chose to press the insurance claims in
Minnesota.
In sum, the plurality presents no analytical framework. After
positing a requirement of "significant" contacts (presumably for
due process purposes), three contacts are addressed of which only
the first is real. That contact, the Minnesota-based employment
relation of the decedent, unconnected as it is with the occurrence,
is too slim a reed on which to hang the choice-of-law decision. 2
Justice Stevens's concurrence distinguishes between the full
faith and credit aspect of the case-infringement on Wisconsin's
sovereignty-and due process to the defendant." I agree that the
two provisions address different concerns and, moreover, that a
state's interest in not having its sovereignty infringed may properly
be kept out of private transactions and occurrences." I find troub-
lesome Justice Stevens's conclusion that due process was satisfied
simply because the parties' expectations were not frustrated and
there was no element of unfair surprise, both findings resulting
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 182 (1936)). Accord, Perloff v. Symmes Hosp., 487
F. Supp. 426 (D. Mass. 1980). See also R.J. WEnTRAuB, COMMENTARY ON THE CoNnIcr OF
LAws 331 (2d ed. 1980). Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12 (1968), is contrary. While the decision
may be open to criticism on choice-of-law grounds, it is constitutionally defensible: the de-
fendant had moved to the plaintiff's state after the accident. Thus, application of plaintiff's
law (forum law) perhaps did not constitute unfair surprise.
82. While the decedent worked in Minnesota and the insurer had insured against
losses in Minnesota, "the fact remains that the accident actually took place in Wisconsin,
that Minnesota therefore lacked any meaningful contact with the case, and that Wisconsin
substantive law must therefore apply where it conflicts with that of Minnesota. By analogy,
the fact that the airplane accident may take place anywhere within several hundred miles of
the scheduled route, and that the airline will be subject to the laws of the place of the
accident wherever it occurs, has never given nearby states carte blanche to apply their own
laws in favor of the survivors of their residents." Martin, supra note 30, at 887-88. In a
comprehensive study of the employment factor as a contact creating a "legitimate interest"
on the part of Minnesota in the application of the lex fori, Professor Brilmayer arrives at
the same result. Brilmayer, "Legitimate Interests" in Multistate Problems: As Between
State and Federal Law, 79 MICH. L. Rav. - (June 1981).
83. 101 S. Ct. at 644-45 (Stevens, J., concurring).
84. See notes 94-95 & accompanying text infra. Apart from Wisconsin's sovereignty,
there is another consideration: "The Full Faith and Credit Clause is one of several provi-
sions in the Federal Constitution designed to transform the several States from independent
sovereignties into a single, unified Nation.... [T]he fact that a choice-of-law decision may
be unsound as a matter of conflicts law does not necessarily implicate the federal concerns
embodied in the Full Faithand Credit Clause." 101 S. Ct. at 645-46 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring). I cannot agree that the conclusion follows from the basic principle. See notes 52-54 &
accompanying text supra; note 152 infra.
[Vol. 32
from the facts that the decedent had paid three uninsured motor-
ist premiums, covering his three vehicles, and that "stacking" is
the more usual rule of substantive law. 5 Thus, while I find the
analytic framework appropriate, the analysis individualizes too
much with respect to the particular case and provides no test
.based on, for instance, the "significance" of the required contacts.
Justice Powell's dissent, while accepting the plurality's basic test
of "significance," correctly finds significant contacts lacking: "The
Court's opinion is understandably vague in explaining how trebling
the benefits to be paid to the estate of a nonresident employee fur-
thers any substantial state interest relating to employment. Min-
nesota does not wish its workers to die in automobile accidents,
but permitting stacking will not further this interest."86
The plurality of four and the single concurrence thus attempt
to state a test. The plurality largely ignores its own test and manu-
factures "contacts," while the single concurrence accepts a most
minimal connection-rather than a more-than-minimum contact,
as I have argued' 7-- for the application of forum law. The four-one-
three decision"8 is thus less than helpful in addressing our growing
fragmentation.
Choice of Law in State Courts
"Governmental-interest" ' 9 and "functional" analysisn con-
ceives of conflicts law as adjective law, that is, the mechanism for
reaching the right result in substantive law terms. The analysis
under these approaches thus places emphasis on the goals, policies,
85. 101 S. Ct. 648-49 (Stevens, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 654 (Powell, J., dissenting).
87. See text accompanying notes 42-69 supra.
88. Justice Stewart did not participate in the decision of the case.
89. See B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963); Currie, Notes
on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171; Sedler, The Gov-
ernmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and Reformulation, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 181 (1977). For an extensive critique of Professor Currie's approach, see
Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REv. 392
(1980).
90. See A.T. von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL
L.Q. 927 (1975); A.T. von' Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems:
Their Role and Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88 HARv. L.
REV. 347 (1974). See generally A. VON MEH EN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE
PROhLEMS 341-75 (1965); R.J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed.
1980).
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value content, and ultimate result of the substantive laws available
for application. Other legal systems assign an ordering function to
conflicts law and thus view it as a separate body of law (private
international law), which determines the applicable law in a neu-
tral and objective fashion without regard to the substantive result,
a point to which I return below.9 1 The difference in conception of
the nature and function of conflicts law-or more accurately per-
haps, the misunderstanding of this difference-has led to much
criticism of the new American approaches.9 2 Some of it is unjusti-
fied. Nevertheless, it is true that governmental interest analysis
often tends to be parochial if the forum is an "interested" state.9 8
Moreover, it tends to inject public law notions into essentially pri-
vate transactions and disputes.9 4 "Comparative impairment" anal-
ysis does no better because its focus also is on "governmental,"
rather than on a party's, interests.95
91. See notes 100-02 & accompanying text infra.
92. See, e.g., Neuhaus, Legal Certainty versus Equity in the Conflict of Laws, 28 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 795, 802 (1963): "In a democratic and pluralistic society, the standards
for judgment cannot be purely personal or irrational; the judge must be guided by generally
recognized standards capable of rational cognition. This is the essential difference between a
democratic legal order and so-called Khadi justice which decides individual cases in accor-
dance with the judge's sense of equity and without reliance on any objective standards." See
also Kegel, The Crisis of Conflict of Laws, 112 HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
RECUEIL DES COURS 91 (1964-11).
93. See Kahn-Freund, General Problems of Private International Law, 143 HAGUE
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, RECUBIL DES Couas 139, 264 (1974-i1): "Only ... in the
court of what Brainerd Currie in his peculiar language called the 'disinterested third state'
has the notion of a 'false conflict' an intelligible meaning." This assessment is an overstate-
ment. See note 103 & accompanying text infra. Similarly, Professor Ehrenzweig's lex fori
orientation drew sharp criticism. Professor Evrigenis called the approach "anti-conflicts
law" (anti-mati&re). Evrigenis, Book Review, REvUE HELL9NIQUE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL
471, 473 (1965). Professor Kahn-Freund thought that Professor Ehrenzweig's approach "is
perhaps no more than a very considerable expansion of the French doctrine of the vocation
subsidiaire and the German doctrine of the Verlegenheitsanwendung of the lex fori, [that
is, the] application [of forum law] where for some reason no other law can be applied....
These doctrines are intended to fill gaps, to remove an exceptional 'embarrassment' (this is
what the German word really means). Ehrenzweig elevated this counsel of despair to a rule
of virtue ... ." Kahn-Freund, General Problems of Private International Law, 143 HAGuE
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, RECUEIL DES COURS 139, 247 (1974-11) (footnote omitted).
94. Kegel, The Crisis of Conflict of Laws, 112 HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
RECUEIL DES COURS 91, 207 (1964-H); A. ANTON, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 41-42 (1967).
The criticism is especially valid in cases not involving personal injury or wrongful death. In
the latter, there may well be a governmental interest in compensating the victim which, in
turn, may lead to the application of a law favoring the plaintiff. See note 4 supra. See also
R. J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONTLICT OF LAws 345-46 (2d ed. 1980).
95. See Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963).
California adopted this approach in Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d
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A major problem with these approaches is ascertainment of
the "governmental interests" or legislative "policies." As Judge
Breitel observed in Tooker v. Lopez:96 "Intra-mural speculation on
the policies of other states has obvious limitations because of re-
stricted information and wisdom. It is difficult enough to interpret
the statutes and decisional rules of one's own state."9 7 Even if the
policies could be discerned more clearly and with more assurance,
the question arises whether it is right to inject them into the
choice-of-law process in areas in which there is no regulatory con-
cern.98 In substantive law, courts always will attempt to achieve
justice in the particular case when established rules would wreak
havoc or when their application would be outrageous.99 After all,
that is the origin of equity jurisprudence. The exceptional, outra-
geous case apart, however, the development of substantive law,
whether by case law or statutory reform, has been concerned with
the integrity of the system-its stability and predictability. Car-
157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978), an opinion that also contains a fair amount of
"better law" language. This aspect of the opinion in Offshore Rental Co. has been criticized
in Kanowitz, Comparative Impairment and Better Law: Grand Illusions in the Conflict of
Laws, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 297-99 (1979). One may also consider Professor Kegel's tongue-
in-cheek criticism of Professor Juenger's suggestion that, in determining the "better law," a
court might consider such traditional connecting factors as nationality, domicile, and situs:
"Why only these? Why not look around the world at large to find the best rule? Why not
also look to the past and into the future? After all, the best would be the best!" Kegel,
Response, in F.K. JUENGER, ZUM WANDEL DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS 35, 36 (113
SCHRIFTEN DER JURISTISCHEN STUDIENGESELLSCHAFT (1974)) (author's translation).
96. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
97. Id. at 597, 249 N.E.2d at 411, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 543 (Breitel, J., dissenting) (empha-
sis added). Similarly, "[i]t is one thing ... to identify the social interests which substantive
rules of law seek to further in internal situations and quite another to project these interests
into situations with a foreign element." A. ANTON, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (1967).
Professor Currie opposed the weighing of policies and interests, among other reasons, be-
cause "[n]ot even a very ponderous Brandeis brief could marshal the relevant considerations
.... " B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 182 (1963).
98. For a discussion of a state's regulatory concerns, see Hay, supra note 1, at 172-76.
See also Brilmayer, "Legitimate Interests" in Multistate Problems: As Between State and
Federal Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. - (1981).
99. See Neuhaus, Entwicklungen im Allgemeinen Teil des Internationalen Priva-
trechts, in INTERNATIONALES PRIVATREcHT AND RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG IM AUSGANG DES 20.
JAHRHUNDERTs-FEsTsCHRIFT FOR GERHARD KEGEL 23, 25 (A. Lilderitz & J. Schr6der eds.
1977) (author's translation: "It is a healthy principle of classic conflicts law that the judge,
as a rule, simply applies the law of that jurisdiction to which the facts of the case have the
closest connection and that he corrects, by means of the public policy defense, only those
substantive results that are manifestly and unacceptably unjust [offensichtlich unertriig-
lich]." See also Bodenheimer, The Need for a Reorientation in American Conflicts Law, in
INTERNATIONALES RECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSORDNUN--FEsTsCHRIrT FOR F.A. MANN 123, 140
(W. Flume, H. Hahn, G. Kegel & K. Simmonds eds. 1977).
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ried over to conflicts law, this is what the German scholar Kegel
calls "conflicts justice," 100 as opposed to case-by-case attempts to
achieve justice in substantive terms. What he means is that con-
flicts law is also a "system" and that its internal integrity is impor-
tant.101 "Conflicts justice" means that such important goals as pre-
dictability and uniformity of result should not have to yield to the
inward-looking results often reached by the governmental-interest,
comparative-impairment, and better-law approaches. 10 2  In the
United States context, I might add that the federal concerns, men-
tioned earlier, call as much for "integrity" in the choice-of-law pro-
cess as do the concerns of the parties or of the particular forum. Of
course, the states of the Union, just as states internationally, do
have legitimate regulatory concerns. However, all conflicts systems
have been able to accommodate legitimate local regulatory con-
cerns (ius cogens) and party expectations, including their protec-
tion against outrageous results. Our federal structure does not jus-
tify the elevation of state law, in general, to the position of a
forum's overriding "governmental interest."
To be sure, the state of the law allows professors of conflict of
laws to devote much class time and a great deal of scholarly ink to
the dissection of cases and hypothetical facts to identify, argue,
and balance "interests," "policies," and the "concerns" of con-
nected and "interested" states, or to seek out obvious or hidden
"false conflicts."103 Given the present state of the law, we must do
100. G. KEGEL, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 54-56 (4th ed. 1977).
101. Id. See also Kegel, Paternal Home and Dream Home: Traditional Conflict of
Laws and the American Reformers, 27 AM. J. Comp. L. 615 (1979).
102. See note 4 & accompanying text supra.
103. The identification of "false conflicts" is indeed helpful for it will often permit
conflict avoidance and lead to the legitimate application of forum law or to the application
of the law of one of two other states in cases in which the forum is disinterested. The classic
examples of "false conflicts" are identity of the potentially applicable laws, difference in
laws but identity of result, and the "disinterest" of the other jurisdiction. There are other
variations. Professor Cavers lists four kinds of false conflicts. D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-
LAW PROCESS 89 (1965). At least three additional false-conflict situations have been identi-
fied. See Comment, False Conflicts, 55 CALiF. L. REv. 74, 76 (1967). All but the most obvi-
ous (identity of law or of result) require the determination of the "interests" of the states
involved. This will be possible in the few cases of "self-limiting" laws, a concept frequently
discussed in the international literature. See, e.g., Kegel, Die selbstgerechte Sachnorm, in
GEDXCHTNISSCHRIFT FOR ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG 51 (E. Jayme & G. Kegel eds. 1976) (with
references to the literature); De Nova, An Australian Case on the Application of Spatially
Conditioned Internal Rules, 22 REvUE HELLtmQUE" DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 25 (1969). See
also Sedler, Functionally Restrictive Substantive Rules in American Conflicts Law, 50 S.
CAL. L. REV. 27 (1976). The disinterest of the foreign jurisdiction may also appear from its
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so in order to give our students the necessary equipment, at least
conflicts rule referring to the forum (renvoi), a short-cut in the inquiry of whether a false
conflict is present of which American courts as a rule, and without much justification, do not
avail themselves. See Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814
(1959). But see RESTATEmENT (SECOND) CONfLICT OF LAWS § 8, Comment k (1971).
Other than in the few circumstances discussed, identifying "false conflicts" is as diffi-
cult as determining governmental interests in "true conflicts." See note 97 & accompanying
text supra. The recent decision in Bing v. Halstead, 495 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) may
serve to illustrate the difficulty. In Bing, an Arizona domiciliary had sent a letter to a New
York domiciliary which was forwarded to the latter's long-term residence in Costa Rica. The
plaintiff-recipient suffered mental distress in Costa Rica and instituted an action for dam-
ages in New York. No jurisdictional issue was raised, but summary judgment dismissing the
complaint was granted because Costa Rican law did not recognize the alleged tort (negligent
or intentional infliction of mental distress), although both New York and Arizona did. Id. at
520. The court concluded that when "interest analysis does not point clearly to the law of
any jurisdiction, the law of the place where the tort occurred prevails." Id. (citing the third
rule of Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 128, 286 N.E.2d 454, 458, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 70
(1972), and Cousins v. Instrument Flyers, Inc., 44 N.Y.2d 698, 699, 376 N.E.2d 914, 915, 405
N.Y.S.2d 441, 442 (1978)). See note 123 infra. The court found that neither New York nor
Arizona had an interest. 495 F. Supp. at 520.
The result is questionable. On interest analysis alone, it is not clear that the alleged
intentional tort occurred in Costa Rica where the letter was read. It might instead be con-
cluded that the alleged tort occurred in Arizona where the conduct occurred, thereby giving
Arizona an "interest" in the regulation of the conduct. Cf. Marra v. Bushee, 317 F. Supp.
972 (D. Vt. 1970) (in intentional tort context, state where defendant principally acts is state
of dominant interest); 2 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 334 (2d ed. 1960) (same). RE-
STATE MENT (SECoND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 154, Comment c (1971) (same). See also LEY OR-
GANICA DEL PODER JUDIcIA, art. 184 (1977) (Costa Rica) (jurisdiction for tort claims lies at
the place where the wrongful conduct or act took place). Is it clear, moreover, that New
York has only a general interest in compensating its domicilary "but not when neither con-
duct nor injury occurred within its borders and when the party seeking protection of its laws
is a long-time resident of another jurisdiction"? 495 F. Supp. at 520. Is it clear, without
specific inquiry into Arizona substantive and conflicts law, that Arizona would not have
applied its law in favor of a New York plaintiff in Arizona when the conduct occurred in
Arizona? Furthermore, what is Costa Rica's interest in shielding one American from liability
and denying compensation to another? Finally, is the whole thing not very possibly a "false
conflict"? First, it is at least arguable that Costa Rica does recognize this tort if intent can
be proved (similar to the French domage morale). See COSTA RICA CODIGE Civu. art. 701
(1975). Second, the Neumeier rules preserve the "place of the tort" rule (whatever that
"place" may be) when other connecting factors do not predominate. See note 123 infra.
Under Neumeier Rule 1, the common domicile of the parties is one such exception. In Bing,
the parties did not have the same domicile but both of their domiciles recognized the al-
leged tort. 495 F. Supp. at 520. Had the action arisen in Costa Rica, it might have applied
the law of the parties' common nationality (here, their two respective domiciles), for which
there is precedent elsewhere. Compare Decision of the Cour d'appel de Nines, Conflicts de
Lois, 62 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PRivA 51, 80 (1973) (French law as law of
common nationality) with Cass. civ., Conflicts de Lois, 56 REvuE CRITIQUE DE Daorr INTER-
NATIONAL Piuvt 705, 728 (1967) (German law applied to car accident of two Frenchmen in
Germany); and compare Regulation of Dec. 7, 1942, § 1 [1942] REiCHSGESEmTZLATr I 706
(Germany) with BGHZ 57, 265 (Nov. 23, 1971). See also Heler, "Wirkungsstatut" als
Anknupfungsbegriff? 10 ZErrSCHRIFT FOR RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 1, 12 (1969) (Austrian OGH,
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the vocabulary, to handle choice-of-law issues encountered in prac-
tice. But do we contribute to the task of the courts? I doubt that
we do much more than reinforce Judge Breitel's conclusion1 ' in
the minds of judges facing true conflicts problems, thereby either
driving them to apply local law whenever they may constitution-
ally do so or to count contacts mechanically. Both subvert the
goals of proper interest analysis. What is worse, in elaborating our
theories and approaches, we often reinvent the wheel. Little con-
flicts writing, with such notable exceptions as those of the late Pro-
fessor Ehrenzweig and of Professors Juenger, von Mehren, and
Nadelmann, considers the study of conflicts abroad.10 5 If it did, we
would see that many of our theories have been previously advo-
cated, tried, and largely abandoned.106
place of tort); Boys v. Chaplin, [1968] 2 W.L.R. 328, 331 (C.A.), aff'd [1969] 3 W.L.R. 322
(H.L.) (common English domicile).
The foregoing is not to assert that the decision in Bing was wrong.I do mean to suggest,
however, that a broad view of false-conflicts analysis might easily have led to a different
result, that such a view of false-conflicts analysis indeed underlies the first of the Neumeier
rules, and that even straight interest analysis (assuming a true conflict) would have permit-
ted the application of either New York law or Arizona law. I therefore conclude that the
identification of a false conflict, beyond the simple cases, is no easier for the courts than
interest analysis in true conflicts. A straightforward rule approach is often helpful. Given
the choice, I would not have applied Costa Rican law just because the letter happened to
have been opened there rather than in New York to where it had been sent, but would have
read Neumeier Rule I as providing for the application of local law whenever liability exists
under the law of the common domicile of the parties or under the law of both their individ-
ual domiciles.
104. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
105. The rich source of comparative material in Ernst Rabel's four volume treatise
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (vol. 1, 2d ed. 1958; vol. 2, 2d ed. 1960; vol. 3, 2d ed. 1964; vol. 4,
1958) seems largely ignored today. On comparative research in conflicts law see A.T. von
Mehren, The Contribution of Comparative Law to the Theory and Practice of Private In-
ternational Law, 26 AM. J. Comp. L. 31 (Supp. 1978); A.T. von Mehren, Choice-of-Law The-
ories and the Comparative-Law Problem, 23 AM. J. CoMP. L. 751 (1975); Juenger, Lessons
Comparison Might Teach, 23 AM. J. COMP. L. 742 (1975); Zweigert, Die dritte Schule im
internationalen Privatrecht, FESTSCHRIFT FOR LEO RAAPE ZU SEINEM S1EBZIGSTEN GxnURT-
STAG 35 (1948); Zweigert, Rechtsvergleichung als universale Interpretationsmethode, 15
ZEITSCHRIFr FOR AUSLXNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 5, 16 (1949).
106. For instance, as Professor Nadelmann has pointed out, governmental-interest
analysis is not new nor is severe criticism of it any more novel. Nadelmann, Internationales
Privatrecht: A Sourcebook on Conflicts Theory Analyzed and Reviewed, 17 HARv. INT'L L.J.
657, 672 (1976) (citing De la Morandire, Preface in H. BATrIFFOL, LA CAPACITE DES
ETRANGtRES EN FRANCE i, ii-xi (1929)). For a discussion of the social purpose of laws, see
Nadelmann, Internationales Privatrecht: A Sourcebook on Conflicts Theory Analyzed and
Reviewed, 17 HARv. INT'L L.J. 657, 669-70 (1976). For the creation of special forum rules for
cases with foreign law elements, see R. AGO, TEORIA DEL Dmrrro INTERNAZIONALE PRuVATO
(1934). The concept of "the most real connection" resembling the "most significant relation-
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The state of our "individual state conflicts law" has been, is,
and continues to be fragmented. 107 Professor Ehrenzweig's call for
the "proper law in the proper forum"108 presupposed such strin-
gent jurisdictional limitations that the application of the lex fori
would then no longer be a problem. We have indeed moved closer
to a limitation of available fora.109 However, our federal structure
will not-and should not-get us to the narrow limits envisioned
by Professor Ehrenzweig or Justice O'Connell.110 Similarly, consti-
tutional limits on choice of law are, and will probably remain,
outer limits at best. Different fora thus are available, and forum
shopping, for choice-of-law purposes, will continue, given the often
permissible and locally preferred application of the lex fori. To re-
iterate, even if permissible within the still too wide constitutional
ship," appears at least as early as 1880. See J. WESTLAKE, A TREATISE ON PRIVATE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW § 201, at 237 (2d ed. 1880). Modem European codifications again utilize the
concept. See note 132 infra. See also 8 F. VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN ROMISCHEN
RECHTS 27 (Berlin 1849) (the "seat" of a legal relationship). The term "homeward trend,"
used to describe many of today's choice-of-law decisions, was coined by A. NUSSBAUM, DEUT-
SCHES INTERNATzONALES PRIVATRECHT 43 (1932). For a brief discussion of this development,
see P. PIcoNE & W. WENGLER, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 306-07 (1974). Professor
Ehrenzweig, consistent with his theory, preferred to speak of a "trend to stay at home." A.
EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 104 (1967). See also Lalive, Remarks, in: 90:2
ZEITScHRIFT FOR SCHwEIzERScHES RsCHT 404, 407 (1971).
107. Confusion and fragmentation also reign in federal courts. As Professor Weintraub
noted, the goal of the Erie-Klaxon doctrine-intrastate uniformity-may be endangered
when federal courts must adhere to state law precedents that are vulnerable to change in
the wake of the conflicts revolution. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLIrT OF LAWS
569-72 (2d ed. 1980). In Lester v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 433 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 909 (1971), the court attempted to apply the modern approach in holding
that it was not required to apply the state's choice-of-law rule when the state had no inter-
est in the matter. 433 F.2d at 890. In Challoner v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 512 F.2d 77
(5th Cir.), vacated, 423 U.S. 3 (1975), the court tried the same technique but was reversed
for departing from the principle set forth in Klaxon. Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner,
423 U.S. 3 (1975). In Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 448 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Kan. 1978),
rev'd, 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979), see notes 68-69 supra, the Tenth Circuit required the
trial court to apply the statute of limitations of the transferor state which, on the facts of
the case, may well have violated due process. In McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,
622 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1980), the Pennsylvania trial court had correctly applied Penn-
sylvania's borrowing statute but was reversed for its reading of the applicable Ohio statute.
Against clear evidence that the Ohio statute of limitations commenced to run with the in-
jury's occurrence, id. at 669-72 (Higgenbotham, J., dissenting), the court held that Ohio
would no longer adhere to this view in the future but would adopt the more widely used
discovery-of-injury test. Id. at 666-67. Challoner thus endangers intrastate uniformity, and
Schreiber and McKenna permit, each in a different way, interstate forum-shopping.
108. See note 43 & accompanying text supra.
109. See note 42 supra.
110. See note 43 supra.
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limits, this is not in the interest of the litigation at hand, of the
legal system, or of our federal structure.
Lest some readers (or all) have by now concluded that the au-
thor is a dinosaur of the First Restatement era, I plead that I am
not. The First Restatement was condemned as too territorial and
too mechanistic.111 It may have provided "conflicts justice," in the
sense mentioned above, but it achieved this goal by means of pro-
visions that were oversimplified or over-general and therefore
tended to lead to more than the usual share of hard cases. The
tension between "conflicts justice" and "substantive justice" grew
too large. We recognized this in the Second Restatement, as have
other legal systems with similarly fixed and inflexible rules."'
The answer to our disenchantment with the First Restate-
ment, however, should not be to do what the market will bear con-
stitutionally by way of the admittedly easier application of local
law. This neither helps the parties"1 3 nor serves our federalism.11 4
Internationally, we stand isolated, except for the growing use of
choice-of-court and choice-of-law clauses.115 Instead, we should at-
tempt the formulation of new principled rules"' on the basis of the
Second Restatement approach.1 7
111. Many of the concrete, definite rules did work and, for that reason, have been
retained in the Second Restatement, sometimes in modified form. This is particularly true
with respect to issues affecting interests in land. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS §§ 223-224, 226-236, 238-239, 241-243 (1971). See also id. § 191 (sale of chattels:
'where under the terms of the contract the seller is to deliver the chattel"); § 193 (principal
location of the insured risk); § 195 (law of the place where the promissory note is payable); §
196 (where services are to be rendered); § 197 (transportation: place of dispatch or
departure).
112. See note 132 infra.
113. Even in tort there may be "party expectations." See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Warren,
475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973). See text accompanying notes 10-11
supra. In any event, there is the factor of unfair surprise.
114. See notes 52-58 & accompanying text supra. "Federalism" in my sense is not
"territorialism"; nor do I understand the Supreme Court's reference to "interstate federal-
ism" in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980), as resurrecting
old notions of territorial sovereignty. "Federalism" rather addresses the coordination of the
legal systems of the states, whereby the reach and applicability of a state's law may or may
not be territorially limited. See P. HAY, FEDERALISM AND SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 80-
87 (1966).
115. See Hoes of America, Inc. v. Hoes, 493 F. Supp. 1205 (C.D. I. 1979).
116. See D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 121 (1965). See also, Cavers, A Cri-
tique of the Choice of Law Problem: Addendum 1972, in P. PICoNE & W. WENGLER, INTER-
NATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 166 (1974), reprinted in 17 HARv. INT'L L.J. 651 (1976).
117. See Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts and Directions for the Future,
16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 39-42 (1977); Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32
CONFLICT OF LAWS
The Second Restatement, with its generalities and lack of
priorities, 1 8 lends itself to all comers: First-Restatement adher-
ents, 1 9  governmental-interest proponents, and even better-law
advocates1 20 can all be accommodated in the "Dream Home. 1 21
We can all profess the same, and continue to act differently. How-
ever, in a series of increasingly concerned articles, Professor Reese,
the Reporter for the Second Restatement, has taken the position
that the Restatement's approach indeed was not intended for con-
tinuous ad hoc decisionmaking, encompassing all existing and fu-
ture approaches. Instead, he sees the Second Restatement as pro-
viding an approach towards the elaboration of new rules for choice
CORNELL L. REV. 315 (1972).
118. The connecting factors in provisions such as §§ 145 and 188 (tort and contract)
are expressly "to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the
particular issue." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145(2), 188(2) (1971) (em-
phasis added). The incorporation, by reference, of the general policies and objectives con-
tained in § 6 will, of necessity, often point in different directions in a particular case and
thus will give little concrete guidance to the court. - See Battiffol, Le pluralisme des
m~thodes en droit international privg, 139 HAGuE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
RECUsIL DES Couns 75, 106 (1973-I). Vagueness and uncertainty may continue in this area
unless courts are willing to elaborate rules, based on the Restatement's approach, giving
them the force of precedent. Some are not willing: "It is undesirable to lay down prema-
turely major premises based on shifting ideologies in the choice of law." Neumeier v.
Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 130, 286 N.E.2d 454, 459, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 71 (1972) (Breitel, J.,
concurring). With respect to the Restatement's issue-by-issue approach, compare Reese,
Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts and Directions for the Future, 16 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 1, 42-43, (1977), with Hay, Unjust Enrichment in the Conflict of Laws: A Compar-
ative View of German Law and the American Restatement 2d, 26 Am. J. Coup. L. 1-49
passim, particularly at 48-49 (1978).
119. See the return to the place-of-tort rule in the third Neumeier rule. Neumeier v.
Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 128, 286 N.E.2d 454, 458, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 70 (1972).
120. Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 959 (1952),
provided the background and source for § 6 of the Second Restatement. See RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2), Reporter's Note (1971); Reese, Conflict of Laws and
the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CoNEME. PROBL. 679, 682 (1963). The article suggested
two additional policies: the desirability of applying forum law unless there is a good reason
for not doing so, and the application of the law that would do justice in the individual case.
Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 959, 964-65, 980-81
(1952). Professor Reese reiterated the first policy in 1964. Discussion -of Major Areas of
Choice of Law, 111 HAGuE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, REcUEM DES Couns 311, 342
(1964-I). The second policy comes close to a "better-law," result-selective approach. Neither
policy was ultimately adopted by the American Law Institute in the formulation of § 6 of
the Second Restatement. Nevertheless, the general policies of § 6 continue to enable a court
to inject better law considerations into its decisions, while § 6(2)(b)--"relevant policies of
the forum"--fairly invites governmental interest analysis and also allows consideration of
forum law as being the "better law."
121. See Kegel, Paternal Home and Dream Home: Traditional Conflict of Laws and
the American Reformers, 26 Am. J. Coup. L. 615 (1979).
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of law.122 The New York Court of Appeals's decision in Neumeier
v. Kuehner 1 2  did just that after many years of struggle and vacil-
lation. It has found followers,1 24 but also critics 25 who would per-
haps reject anything but the new found flexibility-"Khadi jus-
tice" as a European commentator uncharitably calls it 12 -and has
not even received consistent application in its state of origin.2
This is not the place to debate the pros and cons of Neumeier;
that decision simply stands as an example, much to the New York
court's credit, of an attempt to fashion rules from chaos and "ap-
proaches." It is interesting to note-although we have scarcely
done so, let alone tried to learn from it-that the American "con-
flicts revolution" has stirred significant debate in Europe and so
far has resulted in three significant developments: the Austrian
122. Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts and Directions for the Future, 16
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 39-42 (1977); Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57
CORNELL L. REv. 315 (1972); see also Reese, supra note 8.
123. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972). The "Rules" adopted by
the decision are as follows: (1) the law of common domicile of guest passenger and host
driver determines the standard of care owed; (2) there is no liability if the driver acts in the
state of his or her domicile and the law of that state does not provide for liability;, there is
liability if the guest is injured in the state of his or her domicile and that law does permit
recovery; (3) in other cases, "normally" the law to be applied is the law of the place of the
accident, subject to displacement. Id. at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 457-58, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 69-70.
124. First Nat'l Bank in Fort Collins v. Rostek, 182 Colo. 437, 447, 514 P.2d 314, 319
(1973) (Rules 1 and 2 adopted in toto). But see Labree v. Major, 111 R.I. 657, 672-73, 306
A.2d 808, 817 (1973) (Rule 3 rejected).
125. See Sedler, Interstate Accidents and the Unprovided for Case: Reflections on
Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1 HoFSmA L. REv. 125 (1973). Professor Leflar considers the
Neumeier rules "so narrow that [they] would not govern very many future cases." R. LE-
FLAR, AmERcAN CoNnixrs LAW 280 (3d ed. 1977). And Judge Weinstein has cautioned
against unwarranted extension of the Neumeier rules. Chance v. E.I DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 371 F. Supp. 439, 444-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
126. Neuhaus, Legal Certainty versus Equity in the Conflict of Laws, 28 LAw & CoM-
TEMP. PROB. 795, 802 (1963). See also Loussouarn, Cours g~n~ral de droit international
privg, 139 HAGUE ACADEMY OF IMRNATIONAL LAW, REC uEU DES CouRs 271, 338, 342 (1973-
11) ("legal impressionism").
127. See Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856,
(1973); Bing v. Halstead, 495 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Contrary to Professor Leflar, see
note 125 supra, I believe that the Neumeier rules can be extended and applied beyond host-
guest cases. See also Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts and Directions for the
Future, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L 1, 16 (1977). Thus, both Rosenthal (Neumeier Rule 2) and
Bing (Neumeier Rule 1, modified) are examples. For discussion of these two cases, see text
accompanying notes 50-51 supra. Arguably and by analogy, the Neumeier rules can even be
generalized beyond tort. For instance, both the most-significant-relationship test and
Neumeier Rule 2 (second part) point to the application of California law in Lilienthal v.
Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964). See note 12 supra.
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conflicts law128 and the Swiss 129 and Common Market s° draft laws.
All reflect our experience,"' and some provisions, in my opinion,
are distinct improvements over the Second Restatement. The Eu-
ropean statutes reverse the Restatement's approach. Rather than
emphasizing factors of equal weight, which might lead to a deter-
mination of the most significant relationship, the provisions set out
concrete rules, for particular situations, to be supplemented, by a
reference to the most closely connected jurisdiction.1 3 2 The most
128. See Law of July 7, 1978 [1978] Bundesgesetzblatt H 1729 (Austria) (unofficial
translation by Palmer in 28 AM. J. Com,. L. 222 (1980). For a comment on this statute, see
Beitzke, Neues bisterreichisches Kollisionsrecht, 43 RnAELs Z~rrscHRiFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES
UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 246 (1979); Palmer, The Austrian Codification of Con-
flicts Law, 28 AM. J. Com. L. 197 (1980).
129. See Bundesgesetz fiber das internationale Privatrecht (Gesetzesentwurf [Draft],
42 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLXNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 716 (1978).
For comment, see von Overbeck, Der Schweizerische Entwurf eines Bundesgesetzes riber
Das Internationale Privatrecht, 42 RABELs ZErscHmrFT 601 (1978); Neuhaus, Der Schweizer
IPR-Entwurf-Ein Internationales Modell?, 43 RABELs ZErrSCHRIFT 277 (1979); Beitzke, Das
Deliktsrecht im schweizerischen IPR-Entwurf, 35 ScHWEzERiscHns JAHRBUCH FOR INTERNA-
TIONALEs RECHT 93 (1979); McCaffrey, The Swiss Draft Conflicts Laws, 28 AM. J. Comp. L.
235 (1980).
130. The Commission of the European Communities originally prepared a Preliminary
Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracual and Non-Contractual Obligations.
Commission No. XIV/397/72, Rev. 1, reprinted in 21 AM. J. Comp. L. 587 (1973). For com-
ment, see EUROPEAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OsLIGATIONS (0. Lando, B. von Hoff-
man & K. Siehr eds. 1975) and Nadelmann, Impressionism and Unification of Law: The
EEC Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual and Non-Contractual Obli-
gations, 24 AM. J. Comp. L. 1, 11 (1976). The preliminary draft was subsequently withdrawn
and a convention dealing only with contracts was then prepared. Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 23 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L266) 1 (1980). The Con-
vention was opened for signature on June 19, 1980, and signed on that day by Belgium,
Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. For further informa-
tion, see the Commission Opinion of March 17, 1980, 23 O.J. EuR. Com. (No. L94) 39
(1980) and Giuliano & Lagarde, Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Con-
tractual Obligations, 23 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L282) (1980). For a discussion of develop-
ments in the eastern European countries, see Juenger, The Conflicts Statute of the German
Democratic Republic: An Introduction and Translation, 25 AM. J. Coiw. L. 332, 333-35
(1977) (commenting on several eastern European statutes); De Nova, La "Legge
sull'applicazione del diritto" della DDR, RIVISTA DI DIRRITO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E
PROCESSUALE 193 (1976).
131. See Siehr, Ehrenzweig's lex-fori-Theorie und ihre Bedeutung folr das amer-
ikanische und deutsche Kollisionsrecht, 34 RABELs ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLXNDISCHES UND IN-
TERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 585 (1970). See also Cavers, Legislative Choice of Law: Some
European Examples, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 340 (1971).
132. See Law of July 7, 1978 [1978] Bundesgesetzblatt II §§ 36-49 (Austria) (concrete
rules concerning contracts, torts, and other obligations) in connection with id. § 1(1) ("clos-
est connection" as principal test); Bundesgesetz fiber das internationale Privatrecht
(Gesetzesentwurf[Draft]), arts. 121-124, 42 RABELs ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLXNDISCHES INTERNA-
TIONALES PRIVATRECHT 716 (Switzerland) (concrete rules concerning contract) in connection
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"closely connected" law is not a new idea in Europe,33 but the
emphasis on particular facts is. For us, it is a way to fill in the
Second Restatement's approach; for the Europeans, it is the start-
ing point, with the general test to help with the cases not specifi-
cally addressed in the particular rules. Whether a particular set of
rules is considered to be "territorial" 134 or intended to strike a dif-
ferent balance, the point is that some concrete rules come first,
subject to gap-filling or displacement by a more general test, such
as the proviso to Neumeier's Rule Three.38 In the interests of
"conflicts justice," 3 6 without sacrifice of concerns for "substantive
justice," this seems to me the way to go.
Future Directions
The goal of predictability and fairness can be achieved in a
number of ways: elaborating special rules for multistate prob-
lems;137 uniform state legislation; federal common law; 38 federal
legislation; federal treaty. I fear, however, that none provides a so-
lution, either because it is not practicable, because it is undesir-
able, or both.
Special multistate rules are neither practicable nor desirable:
with id. art. 120(1) ("closest connection") and id. art. 129 (concrete rules for tort); Conven-
tion on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 23 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L266) 1
(1980), art. 4 ("closest connection" with presumptions as to the place of the closest connec-
tion) in connection with id. arts. 5-6 (special rules for certain consumer contracts and indi-
vidual employment contracts, respectively) and id. arts. 8-14 (material validity, formal va-
lidity, scope of provisions, capacity, assignment, subrogation, burden of proof). See also the
earlier EEC Preliminary Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual and Non-
Contractual Obligations, Commission Doc. No. XIV/397/72, Rev. 1, art. 10 reprinted in 21
AM. J. CoMp. L. 587, 588-89 (1973) (tort governed by the law of the place of injury, to be
displaced, in certain circumstances, by the law of the state having a "closer connection" to
the case).
133. See note 106 supra.
134. See Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism and Professor Cavers-The Penn-
sylvania Method, 9 DuQ. L. Rav. 373 (1971).
135. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 128, 286 N.E.2d 454, 458, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64,
70 (1972): "Normally, the applicable rule of decision will be that of the state where the
accident occurred but not if it can be shown that displacing that normally applicable rule
will advance the relevant substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth working of
the multistate system or producing great uncertainty for litigants."
136. See notes 100-102 & accompanying text supra.
137. See note 90 supra.
138. This would require overruling Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487
(1941). For a less far-reaching approach, see R. WEITRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLcT
OF LAws 588-90 (2d ed. 1980). See also note 107 supra.
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the former for the reasons stated subsequently with respect to
state or federal legislation, 13 9 and the latter because the introduc-
tion of "multistate rules" into state law, even if practicable, would
create interstate differences in substantive rules ("what is the
reach of statute x compared to y?") or conflicts rules, the differ-
ence-no doubt, and cynically assumed-to be resolved in favor of
the lex fori. "Governmental interests" previously assumed, in most
instances, to exist in favor of the forum would be codified, the "ob-
noxiousness" test 14 0 would automatically be met, and the lex fori
would reign supreme. What, however, makes local lawmakers more
system or federal-conscious than a court? What, except academic
desire and proper academic concern, will make a legislature or a
court produce rules for "multistate" transactions different from in-
trastate transactions, in recognition of the parties' interests? Such
a "global" view is not to be expected. This improbability apart,
"multistate" rules, if individual state law, would also be undesir-
able because resulting differences in state law would now surely
meet a constitutional test for their applicability.14 1 Diversity and
fragmentation may increase or, at least, go unabated.
I will not waste the reader's time on the practicability-yes, it
would be desirable-of uniform state legislation. If, as I had occa-
sion to show over ten years ago, substantive uniform legislation rel-
ative to multistate problems has had a low record of adoption, 4 2
then the adoption of state conflicts legislation, even if proposed as
a uniform law,143 is a utopian dream. Saddled with no-win budget
139. See notes 142-43 & accompanying text infra.
140. See note 54 supra.
141. See notes 54, 140 & accompanying text supra.
142. Hay, Unification of Law in the United States: Uniform State Laws, Treaties
and Judicially Declared Federal Common Law, in LEGAL THOUGHT IN THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA UNDER CONTEMPORARY PRESSURES 261, 262-64 (J. Hazard & W. Wagner eds.
1970).
143. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has adopted
criteria for the determination of whether action on a particular subject is "desirable and
practicable." Criteria indicating that the development of uniform laws in a particular area is
desirable include: "obvious reason and demand for the act, .... reasonable probability" of
adoption by a "substantial number of states," and great prejudice and inconvenience from
the lack of uniformity. Criteria indicating that the development of uniform laws in a partic-
ular area would not be desirable include: absence of "prior legislative [or] administrative
experience" and that the subject matter may be "controversial because of differing social,
economic, or political policies or philosophies among the states." HANDBOOK OF THE NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 196-98 (1967). Beyond the
efforts of the American Law Institute to "restate" conflicts law, there has not been "obvious
... demand for [a uniform] act." Given the current fragmentation, moreover, there is also
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battles, and school and welfare issues, legislatures will not turn to
conflicts law for "rest and relaxation."
To some, the time is not "ripe ' 14 4 to legislate conflicts rules.
This is a sentiment heard through the ages, 1'" and yet it has not
stopped countries from adopting conflicts codes in the past14" or
from attempting major codifications in modern times.' 47 The
codifications were not necessarily perfect nor may they prove to be
in the future. In my view, however, they are more useful starting
points than are approaches advising or condoning ad-hoc deter-
minations.
If revision cannot be done successfully on the state level, then
how? The Supreme Court could overturn Klaxon;1 4 the decision
does not rest on constitutional principles. 149 But the Court very
recently has made it quite clear that it will not do so.150 In stating
its position, the Court addressed neither whether use of the state
choice-of-law rules might be unconstitutional under the circum-
stances' 51 nor whether there was not some federal court responsi-
little likelihood of adoption by "a substantial number of states."
144. See Nadelmann, Impressionism and Unification of Law: The EEC Draft Con-
vention on the Law Applicable to Contractual and Non-Contractual Obligations, 24 AM. J.
COMP. L. 1, 15 (1976); Neuhaus, Empfiehlt sich eine Kodifizierung des internationalen
Privatrechts?, 37 RABELs ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLXNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT
453 (1973).
145. F. VON SAVIGNY, VOM BERp UNSERER ZEIT FUR GESETZGEBUNG UND RECTSWISSEN-
SCHAFT 49 (Berlin 1814).
146. Thus, Germany adopted an incomplete conflicts code as the introductory law
(EINFOHRUNGSGESETZ) to its Civil Code as early as 1896. It has been supplemented by a
number of individual statutes and a sizeable body of case law. See note 103 supra.
147. See note 128 supra.
148. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
149. The Court did state that "the prohibition declared in Erie... extends to the
field of conflict of laws .... Otherwise the accident of diversity of citizenship would con-
stantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting
side by side." 313 U.S. at 496. The statement assumes that in rendering conflicts decisions,
federal courts are indeed "coordinate." However, the constitutional underpinnings of Erie
originate with the statement that "federal courts assumed ... the power to declare rules of
decision which Congress was confessedly without power to enact as statutes" and led to the
conclusion that "except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Con-
gress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state." Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 72, 78 (1938). Without going into the many problems raised by Erie with respect to
the remaining appropriateness for federal common law, it appears that federal power exists
in choice of law, see note 152 infra, and that Klaxon turns on policy considerations which
now bear reexamination.
150. Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975). See 9 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 405 (1976). For additional discussion of Challoner, see note 107 supra.
151. See notes 68-69, 107 & accompanying text supra.
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bility in ordering interstate or state-foreign country relationships.
That view, unfortunate as it may be, is the law. If there is one
thing the federal courts are uniquely qualified-and, in my view,
called upon-to do, it is to order the relation between and among
the states and between and among them and foreign nations.
If ever there is room for "federal common law," it is here.""2
This is not to say that some problems would not remain, especially
in a diversity jurisdiction, for instance with respect to the relation-
ship of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to state law,15 s but
choice of law could be federal law, not only in federal courts but,
152. "Responsibility for allocating spheres of legal control among member states of a
federal system cannot sensibly be placed elsewhere than with the federal government." Bax-
ter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16. STAN. L. REv. 1, 23 (1963). See also Hay,
International versus Interstate Conflicts Law in the United States, 35 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT
FOR AUSLXNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 585 (1970); Horowitz, Toward a Fed-
eral Common Law of Choice of Law, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1191, 1194 (1967); Maier, Coordi-
nation of Law in a National Federal State: An Analysis of the Writings of Elliott Evans
Cheatham, 26 VAND. L. REV. 209, 235 (1973). It is unfortunate that Justice Stevens, in his
concurrence, and, by neccesary implication, the plurality in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 101
S. Ct. 633, 650 (1981), disagree: "It is not this Court's function to establish and impose upon
state courts a federal choice-of-law rule ......
153. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980) (restrictive reading of Rule
3 results in lack of conflict with state rule and consequent application of the latter; concern
for uniformity of federal procedure may also have supported the contrary result). See also
Edelson v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1979). In Edelson, the court held that, under the
Erie doctrine, the federal district court, acting under its diversity of citizenship jurisdiction,
was precluded from entertaining a Pennsylvania medical malpractice claim until the claim-
ant bad first sought arbitration before a panel created by the Pennsylvania Health Care
Services Malpractice Act of 1975. The court found that there were no countervailing consid-
erations, see Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), that would
require a contrary result. 610 F.2d at 139. The arbitration panels created by the Penn-
sylvania statute have extensive powers to make findings of fact, to determine liability and to
award damages. Their determinations may be appealed for a trial de novo to the state court
of common pleas where they may be introduced as evidence. The dissent by Judge Rosenn
thus concluded that by "creating a separate judicial forum, Pennsylvania has attempted to
limit the right of access of residents and non-residents, at least in the first instance, to a
Pennsylvania court." Id. at 145 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). However, "the issue of judicial
function for diversity purposes is a question of federal, not state, law." Id. at 143-44 (quot-
ing Baltimore Bank for Coop. v. Farmers Cheese Coop., 583 F.2d 104, 112 (3d Cir. 1978))
("Congress adopted the policy of opening the doors of the federal courts to all diversity
cases involving the jurisdictional amount to assure suitors from a foreign state of an impar-
tial and neutral forum."). Judge Rosenn thus concluded that "this court has a duty to pro-
vide that independent forum." 610 F.2d at 142. The case may be compared with Wheeler v.
Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218 (D.R.I. 1978), where the court found that a similar statute did
not oust federal jurisdiction because a contrary result would run counter to the federal in-
terest to allow full and fair litigation before a jury. Id. at 226. The Pennsylvania Statute in
Edelson was subsequently overturned on state constitutional grounds: Mattes v. Thomp-
son, 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980).
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through the Supremacy Clause, in state courts as well.'" This
means towards a unified approach has been missed so far.
Federal legislation and the exercise of federal treaty-making
power are also possible, but, I am afraid, are equally utopian ways
of ordering choice of law. The power to implement the Full Faith
and Credit Clause remains largely unexercised, and our record of
participation in international efforts to unify substantive or even
conflicts law is pitiful. 55 The task, once again, falls upon the
courts, if it is to be achieved at all.
Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co.156 and Allstate Insur-
ance Co. v. Hague'57 show us a Supreme Court out of touch with
conflicts law, in theory or in practice. In Thomas, choice of law and
154. See G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 21, 32-34, 95-98 (1977); Westen &
Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REv. 311, 370
n.176 (1980).
155. The United States joined the Hague Conference on Private International Law
and the Rome Institute on Unification of Law as late as 1964. Act of Dec. 30, 1963, Pub. L.
No. 88-244, 77 Stat. 775 (1963). For comment, see Nadelmann, The United States Joins the
Hague Conference on Private International Law, 30 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 291 (1965). So
far, the United States has adopted only the Convention on the Service of Judicial and Ex-
trajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361
T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 9432, and the Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad,
opened for signature March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444. None of the choice-
of-law conventions, including the recent Convention on the Law Applicable to Agency, to
which the American Bar Association had reacted favorably, received serious consideration.
On the Agency Convention, see Hay & Maller-Freienfels, Agency in the Conflict of Laws
and the 1978 Hague Convention, 27 AM. J. CoMP. L. 1 (1979).
Congress recently attempted to implement the full faith and credit clause with respect
to the scandalous and growing problem of child-snatching by the noncustodial parent. In an
amendment to the Pneumococcal Vaccine Medicare Coverage Act, Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94
Stat. 3566 (1980), Congress amended chapter 115 of title 28, United States Code, by in-
serting a new § 1738A, which requires full faith and credit to "any child custody determina-
tion made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another State." The
section details when a determination is "consistent" and includes such jurisdictional bases
as that the state is the "home state" of the child (six months' residence with one parent), or
has a significant connection with the child and at least one parent, or the child is physically
present and an emergency exists. Id. § 8(a). The section does not, and could not, deal with
the jurisdictional issues raised by May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953), which, in analogy
to the divisible divorce concept of Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948), held that a court
could not cut off the custody rights of an absent parent without personal jurisdiction over
that parent. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 248-50 (2d ed.
1980). Congress cannot legislate full faith and credit for determinations rendered without
jurisdiction or, put differently, legislate deprivation of due process (if that is what underlies
May). The new section may therefore be useful only in those cases in which the rendering
court has personal jurisdiction over the noncustodial parent and custody modification is left
to the court rendering the initial custody decision.
156. 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
157. 101 S. Ct. 633 (1981). See notes 71-88 supra.
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recognition of worker's compensation awards (why not judg-
ments? 158) get intermingled, and the plurality endorses a balancing
test, which creates uncertainty with respect to established princi-
ples of full faith and credit.159 Hague, which in essence adopts Jus-
tice Brennan's position in Shaffer with which I began this essay,160
opens the floodgates to the application of the lex fori whenever
jurisdiction exists. This is not "interstate federalism"; el indeed,
the fragmentation it sanctions runs counter to that goal. Why ju-
risdiction requires limits in the interest of "interstate federalism"
while conflict of laws, the more important question, does not re-
quire limits or receives only lip service, 6 2 escapes me. The problem
is thus once again in the lap of the state courts and legislatures.
But, as I hope I have shown, it should not be there. So long as it is
there, subject only to the outer limits of constitutional control, a
great deal of parochialism will continue to prevail. The Court has
the power and the authority for activism in choice of law. 6 s I wish
it would use it.
Short of federal initiative, judicial or legislative, state courts or
legislatures could do more than suffer or perpetuate current ad-hoc
approaches that leave domestic litigants baffled, afraid, or unwill-
ing-for reasons of fruitless expense-to invoke foreign, including
sister-state, law, and that leave foreign-country contracting part-
ners to the vagaries of choice-of-court and choice-of-law clauses.
What could state courts do?
We should recognize, first of all, that many of our "theories"
and "approaches" have their origin in conflicts relative to statutes,
and the arguably regulatory interests they advance. Our theories,
however, generalize beyond these regulatory interests and thus un-
necessarily involve purely private spheres.'" Second, with govern-
mental-interest analysis properly restricted to areas of regulatory
concern, the many available international conventions, ranging
158. See 448 U.S. at 286 (White, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 296 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
160. See note 1 & accompanying text supra.
161. See note 114 supra. See also note 152 supra.
162. See note 74 & accompanying text supra.
163. See notes 152-54 & accompanying text suprac.
164. See Kahn-Freund, General Problems of Private International Law, 143 HAGUE
AcApDy OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, RECUIL DES COURS 139, 246, 253 n.113, 339-40 (1974-III);
Cheatham, Book Review (review of B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS),
62 MICH. L. Rxv. 1475, 1477 (1964).
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from agency to adoption to international sales,6 5 provide ready-
made models for uniform legislation. Absent such legislation,
courts should turn to the elaboration of principled and generally
applicable rules on the basis of the decades of insights gained from
experimentation and the great amount of effort and learning repre-
sented by the Second Restatement. This will not end fragmenta-
tion, however. Many individual states will continue to go their sep-
arate ways. However we turn, the choice-of-law process as an
ordering device seems to have been "led into a dead-end alley." ' I
thus come full circle to the need for federal direction. The present
definition of outer limits of what is constitutional-"minimum
contacts"-is fine for judicial jurisdiction when party convenience
is the main consideration at stake. The same minimum-contacts
standards are not enough for legislative jurisdiction that affects a
defendant's substantive liability.
I thus end on a pessimistic note. Among federal systems in the
world, we are among the few without a national body of substan-
tive law. Even Switzerland, which divides some substantive law-
making between the Federation and the Cantons, considers con-
flicts law to be a federal concern, as do both East and West
Germany.167 In their cases, federal conflicts law primarily serves in-
ternational concerns. We do not even address international con-
cerns through federal action,"" and, faced with much greater di-
versity internally, eschew all federal "ordering" in the private
sphere of choice of law, deigning to act only when an issue rises to
the level of constitutional (usually due process) importance or
touches upon "federal interests" of some importance. 69 It has been
165. See note 155 supra. See also the 1980 Draft Convention Prescribing a Uniform
Law for the International Sale of Goods (prepared by UNCITRAL), 19 INTL LEG. MAT. 671
(May 1980).
166. Rheinstein, Book Review, 11 Am. J. Comp. L. 632, 633 (1962) (quoted with ap-
proval.in Bodenheimer, The Need for a Reorientation in American Conflicts Law, in INTER-
NATIONALES RECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSORDNUNG-FEsTSCHRIFT FOR F.A. MANN 123, 136 (W.
Flume, H. Hahn, G. Kegel & K. Simmonds eds. 1977).
167. See notes 129-130 supra.
168. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (struck down Oregon's "Iron Curtain
Statute," a case of "negative control" rather than rulemaking); Hay, Unification of Law in
the United States: Uniform State Laws, Treaties and Judicially Declared Federal Com-
mon Law, in LEGAL THOUGHT IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNDER CONTEMPORARY
PRESSURES, 261, 275 (J. Hazard & W. Wagner eds. 1970).
169. For the "test" which seems to emerge from the case law, see Hay, Unification of
Law in the United States: Uniform State Laws, Treaties and Judicially Declared Federal
Common Law, in LEGAL THOUGHT IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNDER CONTEMPORARY
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thirty-four years since the Supreme Court mandated a choice-of-
law rule;170 that decision is now largely regarded as an anomaly.1 7
This may or may not be a proper judgment; it may also be that the
Court's record in mandating choice-of-law rules was not good when
it was active in the field, up to perhaps the turn of the century,1 7 2
and in only isolated cases since then.173 None of this, given the
state of choice of law today, should preclude another try.
PESSURES 261, 289 (J. Hazard & W. Wagner eds. 1970). See also Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S.
471 (1979); Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 34-35 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring);
United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973).
170. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947).
See also Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962) (interpreting the provision in the
Federal Tort Claims Act, which refers to the law of the "place where the act or omission
occurred" as including that state's choice-of-law rule).
171. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 526-30 (2d ed. 1980).
172. See G. G"-MORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 61 (1977).
173. See Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932). See note 54 supra.
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